On the Eve of War

History of the Peloponnesian War, Book 1.89-146

DISCLAIMER: I AM NOT AN ANCIENT GREEK SCHOLAR. FOR THE FULL DISCLAIMER, READ HERE.

These were the charges and differences existing between the rival powers before the war, arising immediately from the affair at Epidamnus and Corcyra. Still intercourse continued in spite of them, and mutual communication. It was carried on without heralds, but not without suspicion, as events were occurring which were equivalent to a breach of the treaty and matter for war.

1.146; Richard Crawley Translation

Introduction (and Shop Talk)

I apologize for the over two month absence. Work tends to pick up in the spring just before the end of the school year (I’m a school bus driver), plus I was kept busy with church (I lead a Bible study, plus I do the occasional sermon when the pastor is unable to and no one else is available). At this point, I can’t guarantee going back to weekly posting, but hopefully I won’t go two months.

As I’ve mentioned in the past, when I started this blog I was not going to church, so I had a lot more time on my hands. Now church keeps me pretty busy and requires me to spend time and energy on it that in the past I would have put into the blog.

Anyway, I’ve decided to cover the remainder of Book 1 in this post even though I probably could have divided it into more. From here on out, like with Herodotus, I will be covering one book per post (especially since the books of History of the Peloponnesian War are far shorter than Herodotus).

Even though Sparta has declared war, and in this section the Peloponnesian League (an alliance between Sparta, Corinth, and others) declares war, it won’t be another year before war actually breaks out. Thucydides won’t be writing about the Peloponnesian War proper until Book 2.

In the meantime, Thucydides explains how Athens got so powerful to the point that they became a real challenger to Sparta and relays the story of two influential men, one a Spartan and the other an Athenian, who ultimately abandoned the Greeks in favor of the Persians. I will also once again include a list of quotes from the speeches that I found interesting, along with my thoughts about them.

The Pentekontaetea

The Pentekontaetea (latinized: Pentecontaetia) is the fifty year period between the end of the Persian War and the beginning of the Peloponnesian War. Thucydides sums up why this period of time is important for understanding the breakout of the Peloponnesian War:

“Initially, the Athenians commanded autonomous allies and made their decisions in general congresses. Their supremacy grew during the interval between the present war and the Persian wars, through their military and political actions recounted below against the barbarians, against their own allies in revolt, and against the Peloponnesians whom they encountered on various occasions. My reason for relating these events, and for venturing on this digression, is that this passage of history has been omitted by all my predecessors, who have confined themselves either to Hellenic history before the Persian wars, or to the Persian wars itself. Hellanicus, it is true, did touch on these events in his Athenian history; but he is somewhat concise and not accurate in his dates. Besides, the history of these events contains an explanation of the growth of the Athenian empire.”

1.97; Richard Crawley translation

During this period, Athens shrewdly recognized, in the aftermath of the Persian War, that naval power was the “next thing” that would determine a nation’s position in the world. They began expanding their empire and using the resources and manpower gained to build their army and navy. They also built walls around Athens and walls leading up to the sea so that they could have a protected harbor. Because Sparta was too slow to act (a consistent flaw of theirs), Athens expanded virtually unchallenged until the incidents with Sybota and Potidaea.

By the time the Peloponnesian War broke out, Athens boasted they had the most powerful navy in Greece. They even thought that, even if the Peloponnesians launched a land campaign against them and invaded Attica (the area in Greece where Athens was located), Athens’ navy would be more than enough to conquer the Peloponnesus before they could complete their land campaign (especially since a navy meant being able to easily relocate a population like what Athens did during the Persian War).

This is an interesting case where Athens saw what the future would look like and acted accordingly while Sparta insisted on maintaining their ways. In other words, Sparta got complacent and became slow to act, resting on their laurels as some elite race of warriors descended from Heracles. And while, spoiler alert, Sparta ultimately won the Peloponnesian War, it was at a heavy price. Greece became so weakened over the war, and the squabbles that took place afterward, that Philip of Macedon was able to conquer them.

This conversation is happening today with Artificial Intelligence (just as it happened other technologies I’m sure). If the US doesn’t get on top of AI, if they don’t look to the future and act accordingly, another nation will. And what will happen if that other nation gets the upper hand concerning this technology? If the US does not properly understand AI, or cannot effectively compete, or have a proper countermeasure?

Pausanias and Themistocles

Toward the end of Book 1, Thucydides goes on a tangent to talk about two men who were considered great in their time: the Spartan Pausanias and the Athenian Themistocles.

Pausanias

Pausanias was a Spartan general and the hero of the Battle of Plataea. This was one of the battles that helped the Greeks secure victory against the Persians (you can read about the Battle of Plataea in Book 9 of Herodotus’ Histories).

Afterward, however, Pausanias was suspected of Medism (sympathizing with the Persians). For example, he may or may not have released prisoners of war back to Persia and covered it up as an escape. He also began dressing like a Persian and adopting Persian customs. After complaints of his disagreeable and violent behavior reached the ears of the Spartan government, he was recalled and investigated. While he was not charged with anything, he was not allowed to act in a public capacity for Sparta anymore.

Pausanias left Sparta again and began to collude with the Persians a little more aggressively. If his efforts resulted in Greece being subjected to the Persians at long last, the Persians promised he would be Greece’s king.

However, his plans were thwarted by one of his most loyal servants. This servant had been tasked to send a message to one of the Persian generals. The servant noticed though that every other messenger sent before never returned, so he looked at the message and saw that part of it was an order for the servant’s execution. The servant went to the Spartan government and told them everything Pausanias had been doing and showed them the message.

The government wanted more proof, especially a confession from Pausanias, so two officials went with the servant to a temple and the servant pretended to make himself a suppliant. When Pausanias found out what the servant did, he went to the temple and asked the servant what was going on. The servant told him he found out about the orders for his execution and was shocked because he had only ever been loyal. Pausanias told the servant he would ensure his safety from here on out if he left with him.

In all of this, Pausanias had confessed his collusion with the Persians, all within earshot of the Spartan officials. When the officials came out of their hiding spot, Pausanias realized what was going on and fled. He hid himself inside a very small chamber which made it difficult for the Spartans to get to him, so they simply locked Pausanias inside and starved him. When they took Pausanias out, he died shortly afterward.

Themistocles

During the investigations on Pausanias, it was found out Themistocles may have also been guilty of Medism and the Spartans pushed for his punishment since they despised him. Themistocles was an Athenian general, politician, and master strategist. Themistocles was the one who pushed Athens to build a navy and it was his battle strategy that led to a Greek victory in the Battle of Salamis (a major naval battle during the Persian War). During the Pentekontaetea, it was his shrewdness that ensured Athens could build and fortify their walls without interference from Sparta.

However, even though it was his plan that won the day at the Battle of Salamis, he was also suspected of helping the Persians escape in the aftermath (see Herodotus, Book 8.108-111). This, combined with souring his reputation among the Athenians, forced Themistocles to flee Athens. After some close calls, he made his way to the Persians and Artaxerxes was so impressed with him he was made governor of Magnesia. Themistocles lived out the rest of his days in this role until his death either from disease or poison.

Thucydides had nothing but good to say about Themistocles. Themistocles was basically a once in a generation genius who worked well under pressure and was forward thinking. It’s interesting to wonder if he had been alive for the Peloponnesian War, would the Athenians had won instead?

“For Themistocles was a man who exhibited the most indubitable signs of genius; indeed, in this particular he has a claim on our admiration quite extraordinary and unparalleled. By his own native capacity, which was neither shaped by education nor developed by later training, he was at once the best judge in those sudden crises which admit of little or of no deliberation, and the best prophet of the future, even to its most distant possibilities. An able theoretical expositor of all that came within the sphere of his practice, he was not without the power of passing an adequate judgment in matters in which he had no experience. He could also excellently divine the good and evil which lay hidden in the unseen future. To sum up, whether we consider the extent of his natural powers, or the slightness of his application, this extraordinary man must be allowed to have surpassed all others in the faculty of intuitively meeting an emergency.”

1.138.3; Richard Crawley translation

Some Quotes

Once again, I have a handful of quotes I found thought provoking and want to share. If you’re not interested in my thoughts on them, just read the italicized parts and ignore the rest.

“Besides equitably administering private interests, leaders are required to show a special care for the common welfare in return for the special honors accorded to them by all in other ways.”

1.120.1; Richard Crawley translation

This particular quote stood out to me because of how much modern leadership fails to do this. I see two phenomena happening today:

1. Modern leaders want all the rewards and accolades, but not the duties and responsibilities (this is particular to political offices, businesses, bureaucracies, and the like).

2. People expect leaders to take on all the duties and responsibilities of a leader without the rewards and accolades (this is particular to churches, missions, and the like).

Both are not healthy. A leader should bear great responsibility and should be honored for doing so at the same time.

“Speculation is carried on in safety, but, when it comes to action, fear causes failure."

1.120.5; Richard Crawley translation

Replace speculation with “theory” or “ideology” and this quote hits hard.

“A loan from these enables us to seduce their foreign sailors by the offer of higher pay. For the power of Athens is more mercenary than national; while ours will not be exposed to the same risk, as its strength lies more in men than in money.”

1.121.3; Richard Crawley translation

Machiavelli also warned of the dangers of relying on mercenaries. I wonder if Thucydides influenced him in this regard?

“Out of war peace gains fresh stability, but to refuse to abandon repose for war is not so sure a method of avoiding danger.”

1.124.2; Richard Crawley translation

“It must be thoroughly understood that war is a necessity, and that the more readily we accept it, the less will be the ardor of our opponents, and that out of the greatest dangers communities and individuals acquire the greatest glory.”

1.144.3; Richard Crawley translation

This reminds me of Georges Sorel’s observation that, the more violence is seen as a viable option for resolving conflict, the less violence there is. Here’s a quote from James Burnham about this:

This seeming paradox, that the frank recognition of the function of violence in social conflicts may have as a consequence a reduction in the actual amount of violence, is a great mystery to all those whose approach to society is formalistic. If men believe and say that they are against violence, if they express humanitarian and pacifist ideals, it must follow, so the formalists think, that there will be less violence in the world than when men openly admit the necessity of violence. Historical experience does not, however, bear out this hope… [viable option = less violence] The humanitarian ideals of much of the French aristocracy in the 18^th century did not in the least mitigate the enormous bloodshed of the [French] Revolution and may indeed have greatly contributed to its excess [about 200,000 people died in the French Revolution—about 40,000 from executions—and that was before Napoleon’s wars; compare that with about 25,000 Americans who died in the American Revolution from the war and disease]. It cannot be shown that humanitarian conceptions of criminal punishment, such as have flourished during the past century or more, have decreased crimes of violence. Pacifist, “anti-war” movements are a prominent feature in modern life. They have not at all served to stop the most gigantic wars of history. They have, rather, in those countries where they were most influential, brought about a situation in which many more men have been killed than would have been if political policy had based itself on the fact that wars are a natural phase of the historical process. Countless experiences have proved that a firm blow now may forestall a thousand given and suffered tomorrow.

James Burnham, The Machiavellians: Defenders of Freedom; Lume Books; p. 117

That's all for The History of the Peloponnesian War, Book 1.89-146.

May your days be filled with grace.

-Andronikos

Click here for the reading list I am going through.

Thumbnail: A Roman bust of Themistocles from the reign of Emperor Hadrian. Taken from eranistis.net (a good part of the link is in the Greek alphabet which Substack doesn’t like). I know nothing about this website. I am only giving credit where I found the thumbnail.